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Abstract 
This paper investigates and categorises players in the identity fraud landscape in Australia. The player 
categories include: government and non-government proof of identity (POI) issuers and users; law agencies; 
the perpetrator; target organisations; solution providers and experts; the media; and community interest 
groups. The various interactions and collective arrangements between these organisations within and across 
sectors are important for several reasons. Firstly, in Australia, participants and identity crime perpetrators 
usually need a ‘set’ of POI documents which sum to at least 100 points in order to open accounts or receive 
benefits. The POI gathering sequence is referred to as the ‘circularity effect’ of acquiring POI documents. 
Secondly, perpetrators attack the ‘weakest link’ across a targeted sector and within targeted organisations. A 
contribution of this paper is to educe how organisations, in an IS context, through knowledge management 
(KM), knowledge sharing, sense-making, and organisational learning, from within and across sectors, can 
collectively combat the identity crime phenomenon.   
Keywords 
Information Systems, Organisational Learning, Knowledge Management, Sensemaking, Identity Fraud and 
Related Crimes (Terrorism, Trafficking, Money Laundering) 
Introduction 
This paper addresses the critical issue of how organisations cooperate to make sense of and learn from the 
targeted attacks from perpetrators of identity fraud and related crimes (money laundering, terrorism, trafficking), 
to mitigate losses. Identity fraud refers to the “gaining of money, goods, services or other benefits through the 
use of a false identity” (Australasian Centre for Policing Research 2006, p.9).This paper aims to clarify the 
identity fraud player landscape and the interactive relationship between groups of players (i.e., inter-
organisational and inter-sector; see Wiley, 1988). Together, the participants (excluding perpetrators) are actors 
in the community of ‘identity guardians’ through the security and privacy of our public, confidential or sensitive 
information - where ‘identity’ means an individual’s or entity’s own proof of identity (POI) documentation and 
associated personal identifying information (PII), eg. a password for bank account access. The POI detail 
includes biometric, attributed, and biographical characteristics. Biometric characteristics are mostly fixed and 
stable over time; finger prints, retina, voice, signature and facial patterns are representative of this category. 
Attributed characteristics include our names and biographical characteristics, of which education and 
employment detail are examples. Attributed and biographical data change and accumulate over ones life. Where 
and how perpetrators acquire illegitimately issued and fraudulently obtained POI or PII is paramount for 
prevention strategies and policies. Without mitigating the perpetrators’ attacks, the integrity and trust of the 
whole Australian Identification System (AIS) is at risk. Information Systems (IS), with the advances in 
technology, play a significant and growing role in the collection, storage, sharing and analysis of identity 
information. 
Recent identity fraud related surveys from the United States (ID Analytics 2007) and United Kingdom 
(CyberSource 2007) show the diverse nature of the identity fraud phenomenon within communities. These 
surveys have drawn the public and associated political attention away from perpetrators and towards the victims 
of identity crime. They inform the community through diverse media alerts about needed safeguards to protect 
the public from the threat of identity crimes. The cost of identity fraud in Australia was estimated at A$1.1 
billion in 2002 (Cuganesan & Lacey 2003) and “up to US$2 trillion globally by the end of 2005” (The Fraud 
Advisory Panel 2003, p.1). As a consequence, identity crime may have a discouraging effect on the further 
adoption and uptake of e-commerce/IT/IS (hereafter IS). Reasons include privacy, security, lack of trust, 
economic loss, emotional stress, and reputational losses suffered by victims and targets – individuals and 
organisations. Industry and government are now taking the identity crime phenomena seriously. Anonominity 
granted to identity crime perpetrators through the Internet means that jurisdictional borders are not a restriction 
for perpetrators of identity fraud acts when selecting target organisations. Framed in this context, we are 
motivated, to extend earlier sensemaking research of knowledge management (KM) in organisations (Cecez-
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Kecmanovic 2004; Cecez-Kecmanovic & Jerram 2002) to an inter-organisational and sector levels (figure 1) 
and learning (figure 2) as our conceptual framework for the identity fraud players’ landscape (figure 3). 
Sensemaking is “a motivated, continuous effort to understand connections (which can be among people, place, 
and events) in order to anticipate their trajectories and act effectively” (Klein, Moon & Hoffman 2006). 
“Literally, it means the making of sense” (Weick 1995, p.4). The next section reviews sensemaking and learning 
models in organisations, followed by our sensemaking model extension where we add two knowledge levels.  
We then explain our methodology. Our classification of identity fraud players is then presented and discussed 
with resulting implications and limitations, followed by our conclusions and future research agenda. 
Background to Sensemaking and Learning Models in Organisations 
The sensemaking model of knowledge in organisations (Cecez-Kecmanovic 2004; Cecez-Kecmanovic & Jerram 
2002) identifies four types of knowledge, corresponding to four sensemaking levels (Wiley 1988), individual, 
inter-subjective or collective, organisational, and knowledge embedded in culture. The four identified types of 
knowledge, corresponding to specific sensemaking levels are shown in figure 1 and their interactions shown by 
directional arrows. Cecez-Kecmanovic & Jerram (2002, p.896) posit that the first level ‘individual knowledge’ 
“involves a person’s values, believes, assumptions, experiences, and skills, etc. that enable the individual to 
interpret and make sense of the environment, his/her own actions and the actions by others”. The second level, 
‘inter-subjective or collective knowledge’ “represents shared understanding that emerges through social 
interaction”. The third level, ‘organisational knowledge’ “denotes generic meanings and social structures that 
emerge in and reproduce an organisation”. Their fourth level, ‘knowledge embedded in culture’ “assumes a 
stock of tacit, taken-for-granted convictions, beliefs, assumptions, values and experiences that members of an 
organisation draw upon in order to make sense of a situation and create meanings at all other levels”.  
Organisational learning occurs “when members of an organisation change their shared assumptions and beliefs 
and in turn change the range of their behaviour and enhance their capacity to act” (Janson, Cecez-Kecmanovic 
& Zupancic (2007, p.4). They show how the role of IT systems in organisational learning depends on the nature 
of learning (single-loop, double-loop or triple loop) in a longitudinal study of a Slovenian diversified 
manufacturer. The learning loops are briefly explained with examples relevant to preventing, detecting, or 
deterring identity fraud in an organisation: 
• Single-loop learning, “involves adaptive responses: measuring an organisation’s performance, 
comparing it with its stated goals and taking corrective action to close the gap”. For example, 
single-loop learning comprises adjusting a security system to make sure that system meets security 
standards; 
• Double-loop learning “involves evaluating and changing organisational goals, organisational 
strategies and mental maps”. For example, if a system is hacked with the loss of data, a firm is 
required to rethink its security and develop new mental maps to allow the firm to change its security 
strategy. 
• Triple loop learning “occurs in response to a realisation that existing mental models and ways of 
organisational learning no longer suffice”. For example, inventing a new system or process such as, 
profiling using a computer immunology method to identify and prevent identity fraud perpetrator 
attacks (refer Janson, Cecez-Kecmanovic & Zupancic (2007, pp 6-7) and references therein for 
more explanations of learning loops). 
As a means to better understand learning we make a connection between organisational learning, knowledge 
management, and sensemaking with the aid of the sensemaking model of knowledge in organisations and the 
nature of the organisational learning models described so far. To facilitate this with the data in our study we add 
two levels to the sensemaking model of knowledge in organisations.  
Sensemaking and Learning Models of Knowledge across Organisations 
The sensemaking model of knowledge in organisations we use has been used in IS - for example in case and 
field study in areas of retail, investment banking (both longitudinal, Cecez-Kecmanovic 2004) and tertiary 
education (Cecez-Kecmanovic & Jerram 2002; Cecez-Kecmanovic 2004). We propose an extension of levels 
within the sensemaking model of knowledge in organisations to better fit our data. We extend the four levels of 
knowledge outlined earlier and illustrated in figure 1 to incorporate ‘inter-organisational knowledge’ and ‘intra- 
and inter-sector knowledge’ (both new levels can be across jurisdictions or national boundaries for private 
industry or government agencies) that will correspond with additional levels of sensemaking. We now describe 
these two outer levels (level five and level six):  
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1. Inter-organisational knowledge brings to an individual organisation, shared knowledge from another or 
many organisations participating individual(s) through their social interaction (levels 1 to 4). Also brought 
to the inter-subjective organisational exchange are accumulated interpersonal skills, formal training, 
heuristics, nuances, organisational reputation and power, implicit and explicit organisational imposed 
confidentiality restrictions that extend (and limit) tacit and dynamic exchanges, that enhance knowledge and 
sensemaking of the engaging exchanges in the subject matter under discussion.  
 
2. Intra- and Inter-sector knowledge reaches across the previous outlined knowledge and sensemaking levels 
from individual to inter-organisation knowledge. Individuals engaging at the sector level will exhibit a vast 
array of skills acknowledging her or his elevation of engagement including critical thinking, foresight, 
insight, strategic, and holistic problem solving comprehension capabilities. 
  
 
The focus of this study for level five and six is making sense of and learning (by acting) and thereby making 
more headway to solving the identity crime crisis experienced by each contributing organisation through 
collaborating. Individual knowledge may come from a multitude of disciplines within collaborating 
organisations as exhibited by the roles of interviewees in table 1. In Australia, inter-organisationally, within and 
across sectors this could be facilitated by industry associations, peak bodies, and government committees made 
up of inter-agency and private sector participants.  
Methodology 
The aim of this research is to determine the main categories of identity fraud players (in Australia) and how they 
interact with one another to deter, prevent and detect identity fraud perpetrators. We hypothesise that target 
organisations within a sector and across sectors that cooperate, coordinate, communicate and learn (Janson, 
Cecez-Kecmanovic & Zupancic 2007) through interacting and using knowledge management and sensemaking 
(Cecez-Kecmanovic 2004; Cecez-Kecmanovic & Jerram 2002) will have a higher probability to combat identity 
fraud. The research design identifies, from the literature, some existing identity crime players (Cuganesan & 
Lacey 2003; Tan 2002; Wang, Yuan, & Archer 2006). Semi-structured interviews were undertaken with experts 
from industry and government groups, which were identified from earlier empirical studies (Cuganesan & Lacey 
2003; Wang, Yuan, & Archer 2006). Interviewees from these groups are representatives of the major 
organisations targeted by identity fraud perpetrators. 
First, a pilot interview evaluated the proposed questions for their suitability, coverage and to determine 
interview duration. The interviews were recorded, transcribed, coded and analysed using NVivo qualitative data 
analysis software (QSR International). The organisations and interviewee roles are set out in table 1. At the top 
level our interview protocol questions followed several main themes including: what is identity fraud in your 
organisation; managing identity fraud; identity fraud reporting; and identity fraud issues and research. Individual 
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questions are not included for brevity. Our approach, in order to gather deeper insights from the interviews, 
includes participant quotes (in italics) of challenges, issues and mitigation strategies adopted by interviewees’ 
organisations. 
Table 1: Participant Interview Category and Role Key 
Participant  Participant Category Participant Role 
1 Bank 1 1. Head of Fraud – Policy & Strategy 
2 Bank 2 1.Chief Manager Operational Control 2.Fraud Management  
3 Bank 3 1. Manager Research & Intelligence 2. Intelligence Officer   
3. Business Services 4. GM Strategy & Security Risk 
4 Licensing Authority  1 1. Licensing Policy & Projects 2. Manager of Finance & 
Operations Audit 3. Investigations External Fraud  
5 Licensing Authority  2 1. Manager 
6 Telecommunications 1 1. Fraud Risk  
7 Government Agency 1  1. Compliance, Integrity & Documentation Examination  
8 Government Agency 2  1. Detection & Review 2. Manager 3. Investigations ID Fraud 
Specialist 4. Manager 5. Quality POI team 6. Manager 
9 Government Agency 3  1. Director Internal Audit 2. Internal Issues Manager 3. Program 
Delivery 4. Manager 5. Manager 
10 Government Agency 4 1. Deputy CEO – Corp Services and Regulatory Issues 
11 Government Agency 5 1. Client Account Management 
12 U.S. Criminologist  1. Academic – Professor  
Model Categorising Players in the Identity and Identity Fraud Landscape 
The identity fraud player landscape is larger and involves more people and organisations than just the 
perpetrator(s). Figure 3 was derived from the previous literature (refer Wang, Yuan, & Archer 2006; Tan 2002; 
Cuganesan & Lacey 2003) and then modified from the results of the interviews. This model shows our 
categories of main players and their interactions, shown by the lines between them.  The interactions convey the 
merits of knowledge sharing, making sense of this sharing and learning. These findings were the grounding for 
the extensions to the adapted models in figure 1 and figure 2. We did not interview players in media or 
community organisations, but we did discuss the media and community organisations with interviewees and 
their interactions to elicit their perspectives. Responses from interviewees in table 1 provide our scope. Most 
interactions between the categories are centred on POI and entities trying to mitigate perpetrators’ identity 
frauds.  
 
 
Government Agencies 
Government agencies in figure 3 interact with all other categories. They are diverse and include: legislators and 
regulators; welfare (POI issuers and users); and research. Many government agencies are a monopoly within a 
country - for example, immigration, tax, and therefore collaboration within a country is often across sectors. In 
this case within sector collaboration takes place across country jurisdictions e.g., immigration. Yet with road 
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transport, and births, deaths and marriages, there may be an agency in each state, with sector cooperation 
occurring within a country but also across state jurisdictions. 
Legislators play key roles in writing new laws and amendments for identity fraud and related crimes nationally 
and internationally. The State of South Australia is the only state to enact identity fraud related legislation (in 
2004) therefore making identity theft a crime in that state. However, the State of Queensland has just recently 
introduced an identity fraud bill. The Federal government also has documentation on identity fraud that has just 
completed the public discussion phase. The Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 
(which replaces the Financial Transaction Reports (FTR) Act 1988) requires Australian financial institutions, to 
undertake certain steps when dealing with customers who transact cash over A$10,000 or who act suspiciously. 
“Most people know about the 100 points (POI) system. You need your driver’s licence, a couple of credit cards, 
and your Medicare card to add up to 100 points” (Participant 10). These POI documents form the base set of the 
AIS documents issued and used by government agencies and are an inter-organisational link. “You explain in 
real terms the ‘circular path’, how people use documents to get one and then the other, so we rely on things like 
passports, immigration papers and so on. The date of birth is one key identifier” (Participant 4:1).  
In Australia, there are a number of government agencies (see Cuganesan & Lacey 2003, Table 5, 6 and 12, 
pp.49-51 and p.70.) that issue and use POI. At the Federal level for example, Centrelink for pensions, 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade for passports, Department of Immigration and Multicultural and 
Indigenous Affairs issue visas and citizenship certificates, and the Australian Securities Investment Commission 
issues company registrations. State or Territory issuers and users include road transport authorities, Birth, Death 
and Marriage registries, and Fair Trading Offices (Business Name Registrations). Participant (8:6) explains their 
organisation’s approach “our particular model is based on tier levels, depending on the POI document, and 
degree of risk. We’ve gone, rather than sticking to primary and secondary (identification) that a lot of other 
agencies still have, to a points system.  So basically it’s a risk-based model.  We know if we do some work for 
Participant 11, which will be a tier 3, which is our top tier, we can meet their requirements quite readily”.  
Legislators also set up organisations to research identity crimes. The Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC), 
a Commonwealth statutory authority, operates under the Criminology Research Act 1971. The functions of the 
AIC include: conducting criminological research; communicating the results of research; conducting or 
arranging conferences and seminars; and publishing material arising out of the AIC's work. Other organisations 
set up similarly with a research component include: the Australian Centre of Policing Research (ACPR); the 
Australian High Tech Crime Centre (AHTCC); and the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre 
(AUSTRAC). The ACPR liaises closely with other national police services, such as the National Institute of 
Forensic Science, the National Crime Statistics Unit, the Australian Institute of Police Management and 
CrimTrac. The ACPR is an active member of a number of government agency and private sector working 
groups and committees (e.g., the Australian Bankers’ Association Fraud Task Force, the AUSTRAC Proof of 
Identity Steering Committee and the AFP Opal Group) that address identity crime issues. The Australian High 
Tech Crime Centre (AHTCC) consists of representatives from private sector and government. The AHTCC’s 
brief is to combat serious and complex high tech crimes, especially those beyond the capability of a single 
jurisdiction. An integral part of the AHTCC is the Joint Banking Finance Sector Investigation Team (JBFSIT) 
combating internet banking fraud. AUSTRAC was established under section 35 of the FTR Act. AUSTRAC has 
many partners, such as the Australian Crime Commission, Australian Customs Service, and the Australian 
Federal Police. Government agencies show many interactions and collaboration across organisations, and within 
and between sectors.  
Private Sector 
The dominant non-government (industry) POI users are those organisations targeted by identity fraud 
perpetrators, such as financial institutions (banks), utility organisations, and retailers. Non-government POI 
document issuers include all organisations that as ‘part of their normal business’ issue documentation with 
personal identifying information (e.g., name, date of birth, address, age). While organisations are assumed to 
have a ‘duty of care’ when holding employees or customers PII most organisations stipulate or consider the 
gathering of this information is for a specific purpose e.g., a bank statement or utility bill is a record of a 
customer’s spending habits and account of their liabilities not POI points. The identity fraud perpetrator directly 
targets the weakest link in the AIS, seeking to obtain legitimately issued but fraudulently obtained POI 
documentation. The process is made easier for the perpetrator with the anonymonity of a victim’s POI and PII 
details and organisations who operate in isolation or in another jurisdiction. “These kinds of displacement theory 
displacement phenomenon … it relates to this whole issue (identity fraud) – there is this constant thrust and 
parry” (Participant 12) to find the weakest link.  
An extract list of non-government POI issuers and their documents that contain various PII are discussed next 
(refer Cuganesan & Lacey 2003, Table 5 and 6, pp.49-51). Educational organisations (Secondary, Tertiary and 
Institutes) issue certificates of qualification (educational and trade qualifications), student identity cards, 
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certificate or statement of accomplishment or enrolment and letters (POI should not be more than 12 months 
old) from principals that are recognised as POI when issued from bone fide educational institutions (Smith 
2006). Financial institutions under the Australian FTR Act 1988 include Banks, Building Societies, and Credit 
Unions (e.g., Savings & Loans in the US). POI documentation issued includes current credit and debit cards or 
account cards or passbooks. Examples of utility organisations include telecommunication companies (also 
Internet Service Providers), electricity suppliers, gas suppliers, water service providers and councils. These 
organisations issue POI such as, statements (with current address) and accounts (not more that 12 months old) 
that are used by others as part of their POI processes. Health insurance and health fund organisations issue 
membership cards, statements and other documentation of payments that are used as POI by various government 
and industry organisations. Examples of other non-government POI issuers include: associations; groups; and 
peak bodies; libraries; clubs (e.g., League); unions and associations who also issue ‘secondary’ POI that form 
part of Australia’s identification system, such as membership cards, statements and other documentation or 
payments.  
Within the private sector the distinction between individual sectors is clearer with many banks, retailers, or 
utilities grouping in a sector. Feedback from interviewees suggested collaboration within a sector regarding 
systems or processes did not normally occur due to competitive advantage issues. However, when it came to 
combating new crimes such as identity crimes, organisations were openly cooperating. Inter-sector collaboration 
in the private sector was a newer innovation. A large amount of information sharing occurred with government 
agencies, especially law enforcement agencies, such as the Police. 
Law (Enforcement) Agencies 
Law enforcement, courts, and corrections systems are the focus of this section. One of the difficulties for law 
enforcement in combating identity fraud and related crimes arises from a unique feature of the crime pertaining 
to the legal jurisdiction responsible for adjudication of a crime. Confusion over who should investigate and 
prosecute leads to inconsistency in reporting and frequent lack of action. Identity crime raises issues such as, the 
adequacy of current legislative regimes, training for police and the community in prevention and response 
measures, and dealing with a range of victim-related issues, including legal standing or status and privacy 
restrictions or requirements. Government law enforcement agencies often collaborate with each other (e.g., see 
Government Agencies section) as well as with other government and industry organisations, associations, 
commissions and groups in order to combat identity fraud. For example, Participant 4(3) states, “I’ve been put in 
place basically to allow the backdoor to be opened up slightly. To allow information flow to come through and 
to assist law enforcement agencies with evidence gathering and various checking. Quite a significant finding is 
that, with 80% of detection of people getting through the frontline is found through that particular process. We 
know that there are legitimately issued, fraudulently claimed licenses, and we collate points, and sometimes the 
real person’s license is then cancelled.  In an experimental stage at the moment, where if financial institutions 
suspect that they’ve got a fake license holder before them, and they can provide my area with a good quality 
copy of that particular document - so it’s got to be able to see the image and they state why they think it’s a fake 
document”.  
Police in general and fraud squad members in particular interface with industry e.g., retailers and financial 
institutions (mostly banks), to try and stop identity crimes. Another example of when police work in conjunction 
with organisations is in remote areas of Australia. A real life situation in an Australia State is related by 
Participant 5(1), “at a higher level State Transport and State Police both are working pretty closely both in the 
issuing of licenses in remote ... in major cities and towns around the State, State Transport has the function of 
doing the license issuing function, but in a lot of the smaller remote type areas State Police will act as our 
agent. So there is some close working links between us and State Police in that regard”.  In an e-fraud 
environment, stopping perpetrators “requires law enforcement officers to move just as quickly (as the 
perpetrator) and demands unprecedented cooperation among a whole spectrum representing government, 
business and consumer groups not just from the place of the offence but across national or state borders as 
online transactions usually span different geographical borders” (Tan 2002, p.353). In Australia, the following 
judicial punishments are currently available in most jurisdictions for identity fraud and related crimes (money 
laundering, drugs, terrorism, immigration etc) caught under various legislation and amendments including, fines, 
restitution and compensation orders, forfeiture and disqualification (confiscation), unsupervised release 
(suspended, deferred, conditional sentences), supervised release (probation, community service, intensive 
corrections),  custodial orders (either full time or periodic) (see Graycar 2000 p.12), immigration detention 
centres, and deportation. In the US, specific legislation has been introduced to deal with identity-related crime. 
The Federal Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998 (18 USC 1028) makes identity theft a crime 
with maximum penalties of up to 15 years’ imprisonment and a maximum fine of US$250,000. Australian 
government organisations investigate and refer serious breaches of the law to the Commonwealth Director of 
Public Prosecutions to consider for criminal prosecution. Several perpetrators have now been successfully 
prosecuted by government agencies, with their actions being viewed very seriously by the courts. A major part 
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of identity fraud and related crime deterrence is punishment delivered by a country’s judicial system as set down 
by legislation. The role of correctional systems is to carry out the court imposed custodial sentences. In Australia 
correctional facilities include detention centres (DIMIA) and prisons.   
Identity Fraud Perpetrators 
We classify identity fraud perpetrators into four distinct categories (see, Jamieson, Stephens & Winchester 
2007). The first is organised crime groups. “Organised crime groups are usually sophisticated, networked and 
well resourced” (Participant 4). “In some of those cases the target audience receiving licenses was outlaw 
motorcycle gangs” (Participant 5). “A lot of this form is organised, particularly Asian syndicates (e.g., Triads)” 
(Participant 1). The second category of perpetrators is sophisticated individuals or pairs, often specialising and 
proficient in certain methods of identity fraud acts. These sophisticated individuals are more likely to be traders 
in identity documentation and be part of an underworld network often in an e-commerce environment 
frequenting specialist sites to trade (chat rooms, blogs). An example, of a specialised method is phishing, where 
a perpetrator impersonates a trusted organisation, creating false emails and Web sites to steal personal 
information. A question posed was: do you have a feel for what ID fraud you’re not detecting? A typical answer 
was “probably the most sophisticated ones get through” (Participant 8:3). The third category is the more 
opportunistic perpetrators. They will often obtain POI or PII through theft of mail, dumpster diving, or mail 
redirection. Over time they may (have to) become sophisticated, graduating to the second category. “As a lot of 
the amateurs have been squeezed out (or caught)” (Participant 1). The fourth category operates internally in the 
target as an agent of the organisation (includes: employees; contractors; and consultants). Employees have also 
been used by organised gangs to infiltrate an organisation.  This requires far more vigilance and better controls 
to be in place in the target organisations (refer, Wang, Yuan & Archer 2006). While we identify four broad 
categories in our classification, we are unable to answer the generic question: what does an identity fraud 
perpetrator look like? There is no one answer. Perpetrators to-date has come from all walks of life and includes: 
males; females; rich; poor; and most ethnicities; locations; and age groups. Worse still, they are also 
collaborating as well.  
Targeted Organisations 
Perpetrators target both public and private organisations. Perpetrators target these organisations to obtain 
POI/PII and then using this illegally obtained information to by-pass security for an economic benefit – 
committing identity fraud acts. Target organisations to-date have predominantly been financial institutions – 
especially banks, utility organisations, retailers and government welfare agencies but include all sectors of 
economic activity (see Cuganesan & Lacey 2003). To counter these attacks the Australian government has set 
up committees and taskforces to tackle the identity crime issues. The Identity Crime Taskforce includes: 
Australian Federal Police; NSW Police; NSW Crime Commission; NSW Independent Commission Against 
Corruption; and the Australian Crime Commission. Private organisations weigh up the dollar amounts taken by 
the perpetrator against the recovery and remediation costs. For instance with banks, retailers and utilities 
organisations, “there’s a ‘threshold effect’ that takes place when systems get too over burdened with cases” 
(Participant 12). In Australia in the mobile phones sector this threshold might be $50 per user’s phone for 
example. “The hacking incidents are where the excess usage is – the biggest one I’ve seen is just $900. That way 
exceeds anything else” (Participant 6:2). “The cost (loss) is basically rolled over … to the customer there’s no 
gain to be made going through the criminal justice system” (Participant 12). However, these small individual 
losses across 10,000 incidents amount to a significant total economic loss.  
Within sectors, targeted organisations often meet and strategize how, as a group, to combat identity fraud with 
new systems. “We turn up to these fraud forums … re  the Telco sector and even with I-Me blocking a 
perpetrator’s mobile is rendered useless within Australia. But organised crime will just send these things 
overseas” (Participant 6:1). Personnel within targeted organisations (government and private sector) as members 
of groups, forums and associations gather intelligence through these intra- and inter-sector networks. “We get 
some sort of feedback – areas of which I have been involved with include: Australian Bureau of Criminal 
Intelligence; the Australian … AusRoads Administration and Licensing Group; and Interagency Fraud 
Committee” (Participant 4:3). For example, “AusRoads in all their jurisdictions are tightening up their identity 
processes, so we are going to be adopting similar processes” (Participant 5). 
Solution Providers and Other Experts  
Solution providers include technology organisations, researchers, industry associations, manufacturers, and 
standard setters of POI documents. In an IS context, solution providers are playing an increasing part in the 
identity fraud player landscape, due to the pervasive increase of the Internet and e-commerce as an attack 
channel and the innovations in IS related methods of attack. The link between targeted organisations and 
solution providers is grounded from interviewee organisations providing verification, credit and fraud checking 
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data services. With recent applications moving from delayed (24 hours) to real time or even where “both systems 
(run) in parallel. Where the delayed system is used as a search database (knowledge management) from the 
outside – by law agencies” (Participant 4). For example, “we use credit bureau Baycorp products including 
Fraud Check and Decision Point - to check identity … also Hunter and VeriCheck” (Participant 6:1). “We use 
NEVUS, which is a national system allowing us to look at licensing information from NSW and other States” 
(Participant 5). Researchers investigating solutions into identity fraud can be funded by government (eg., the 
Australian Research Council (ARC) grants) and/or industry. For example, the SEAR (Security, E-Business, and 
Assurance Research) group at University of New South Wales. 
Industry experts include auditors, forensic accountants, and computer specialists. Often these professions have 
barriers to entry in the form of skill sets, and tertiary and professional examinations. Expert’s skills are of 
increasing importance when organisations or their customers follow remediation processes. Solution providers 
interact with targeted organisations to reduce risks for their clients. An irony of being good at risk reduction is 
an “escalation of criminal behaviour. You could create some more serious scenarios. Make it almost impossible 
to steal someone’s ID through the Internet then they actually go kill someone to steal biometric data or 
whatever. But end up actually escalating the problem” (Participant 12).  
The Media 
Media organisations may be owned by government or private organisations and include television, radio, 
newspapers and magazines. Often organisations, associations, peak bodies, and community groups, both 
publicly or privately operated have their own media sections and personnel who release information directly to 
members and the public via their websites or via the media. Television and newspapers have been the dominant 
mediums exposing identity fraud perpetrators in Australia over the last few years. Media coverage deals with 
public awareness, concern, educating and alerts, by generally informing them. On the other hand freelance and 
investigative journalists also play important roles by researching information below the ‘spin’ of the public or 
private organisation releasing initial information.  
Other roles played by the media can include waging campaigns for (against) proposed legislation that might 
increase (restrict) access to data. The media are not bound by the Privacy Act 1998. There is “this whole notion 
of where the public stands on it, it effects policy making and related issues. That notion of cultural diffusion is at 
work you could have a major problem. It’s probably going to reach some critical level where it’s going to enter 
the political arena. The issue of identity fraud is probably increasing in terms of public consciousness. One 
major debate that it has infiltrated is in acts of terrorism” (Participant 12). 
Community Groups 
Community based groups, set up to mitigate identity crimes are backed by government or the private sector as 
outlined above, e.g., Australian High Tech Crime Center and Australia Bankers Association (ABA). Other 
collectives are privacy groups (e.g., Australian Privacy Foundation) who provide a balance in the debate for 
consumer protection for privacy and security of their identity information and rights from government and 
industry. “It might be useful to have some market research on what the community thinks (about centralised 
identity databases)” (Participant 4:1). To abate ‘big brother’ fears about the protection of POI and PII data 
(including images) systems for the country’s citizens. “A constraint on this system is that identity issuers and 
users rely on each others information – the ‘circularity effect’” (Participant 4:1). “Another difficulty is that we 
have to operate within the parameters of privacy legislation. We have our own privacy officer. And he liaises 
with the NSW Privacy Commissioner” (Participant 4:3). “We’re restricted by the Privacy Act and the Social 
Security Act” (Participant 8:5). Legislation in Australia, US and other jurisdictions are receiving renewed 
attention due to recent data breaches and data matching programs of government and industry. “I think that there 
is certainly a lot of data sharing and information sharing between agencies. But there are inhibitors on what we 
are allowed under our legislation to share and privacy considerations. We have to work within these 
parameters” (Participant 7). “There is the privacy commissioner who reminds us it is not mandatory in a lot of 
instances to quote your tax file number” (Participant 11). In summary, checks and balances are important too. 
Information Systems (manual and automated) knowledge sharing is an example of how organisations are 
collaborating, monitoring, managing knowledge and learning through sense-making at the inter-organisational, 
intra and inter-sector levels. 
Implications and Limitations 
The implications for organisations that collaborate within and across sectors, industry and government are 
positive. The research has identified that through industry groups (e.g., AUSTRAC, Australian High Tech 
Crime Center including JBFSIT; ABA, i.e., banking groups fighting the same enemy), committees (AUSTRAC 
Steering committee, The Identity Crime Taskforce), research groups (AIC, SEAR) has drawn out that there is a 
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lot of sensemaking at our extended levels. Learning and associated actions were just filtering through at 
interview time mostly at the first-loop. A limitation of this study is that we did not interview perpetrators or 
players from community groups, the media, or solution providers - our scope was from the targets’ perspective. 
Also the communities within different states and jurisdictions will differ across countries. However, we start the 
process within an Australian context.  Our approach could also be adapted to other crimes or phenomenons that 
similarly require collective actions for mitigation. 
Conclusion and Research Agenda 
In this paper we have argued that to combat identity fraud perpetrators in an IS context, targeted organisations 
need to collaborate. Our approach sought to conceptualise the sense-making model of knowledge management 
in organisations (Cecez-Kecmanovic 2004; Cecez-Kecmanovic & Jerram 2002) and organisational learning 
(Janson, Cecez-Kecmanovic & Zupancic 2007) to an inter-organisational, intra and inter-sector context 
grounded from industry and government player interviews.  
Feedback from industry experts determined that many organisations both public and private are collaborating to 
combat identity fraud perpetrators. There was evidence that target organisations who ‘went it alone’ became 
weak links in the Australian Identification System and were ‘picked off’ by perpetrators. Organisations both 
public and private that collaborated had better identity defenses through information sharing. The categorisation 
of participants in the player landscape and perpetrators will facilitate future prevention, and detection strategies, 
tools and solutions. Developing and testing profiling tools within and across databases in the IS space to combat 
this phenomenon is on our identity fraud research agenda.  
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